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effect of their decision to only future cases. The change of a statute
from "constitutional" to "unconstitutional" or from "unconstitu-
tional" to "constitutional" is not a change in the statute nor a change
in the constitution; it is a change in judicial decision interpreting
both and should be treated accordingly.
Mark Graham
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURERS-A DUTY TO INSPECT?
Plaintiff, injured at work when a cable on a crane broke, sued his
employer's workmen's compensation insurance carrier as a third-
party tortfeasor, alleging that the insurer had gratuitously under-
taken to inspect the working premises, and in so doing negligently
failed to detect and remove the cause of plaintiffs injuries. The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held since there was no un-
dertaking by the insurance carrier either gratuitous or contractual to
inspect for plaintiff's benefit it owed him no legal duty. Kennard v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 277 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973).
Whether the employer's workmen's compensation insurer can be
liable as a third-party tortfeasor has been the subject of much contro-
versy.' More often than not the decisions have turned on the question
of the insurer's immunity under the exclusive remedy provisions2 of
the workmen's compensation acts, probably because the courts
1. See, e.g., Beasley v. McDonald Eng. Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So. 2d 844 (1971);
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); Fabricius v.
Montgomery Elev. Co., 254 Iowa 1311, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963); Smith v. American
Empl. Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Theus,
493 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1972); Kerner v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391,
151 N.W.2d 72 (1967). See generally 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 72.90 (1970).
2. Some state workmen's compensation statutes explicitly grant to the workmen's
compensation insurer the same immunity from third-party tort actions that is enjoyed
by the employer by means of the exclusive remedy provision. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.03 (2) (Supp. 1961), amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (1957), which provides
that "the right to the recovery of compensation pursuant to this chapter shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and the workmen's compensation insurance
carrier." This particular provision was interpreted in Kerner v. Employer's Mutual
Liability Insurance Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W.2d 72 (1967) and discussed in a
comparison with Michigan law in Ray v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 10 Mich. App.
55, 158 N.W.2d 786 (1968). Cf. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950), which states in part: "The
rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of a
personal injury . . . shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such em-
ployee .... "
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sought to avoid difficult problems of substantive tort law.3 Pretermit-
ting that issue, the court in the instant case addressed the question
of the insurer's legal duty to the plaintiff arising out of the insurer's
allegedly negligent inspection of the working premises. The insurer
owes no more duty than any third person to inspect for the benefit of
a worker simply because an opportunity to do so arises; the basic duty
of safety inspection and maintenance rests solely with the employer.'
The basic inquiry is whether its inspections, by failing to obviate
conditions dangerous to workers, results in tort liability."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts' suggests the circumstances
In other state statutes which contain vague exclusive remedy provisions similar
to Louisiana's, the cases have liberally interpreted them to grant immunity to the
insurer. See, e.g., Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890 (D.R.I. 1967);
Donohue v., Maryland Cas. Co., 248 F. Supp. 588 (D. Md. 1965); Kotarski v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
120 Ga. App. 791, 172 S.E.2d 147 (1969). The decision in Kotarski was rejected by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in Ray v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 10 Mich. App. 55,
158 N.W.2d 786 (1968).
A growing number of state legislatures have amended their statutes to protect the
insurer from tort liability in response to decisions which have found them amenable
to suit. The best example is New Hampshire's amendment following the decision in
Smith v. American Employers Insurance Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281:14 (1966). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (1967) (which
vitiated the holding of Mays v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.
1963)); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (1967) (an amendment probably motivated by
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964)).
3. Compare Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890 (D.R.I. 1967)
(which was decided on the basis of the immunity problem), with Nelson v. Union Wire
Rope Corp., 31111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964) (which grapples with the multifaceted
tort issue).
4. LA. R.S. 23:13 (Supp. 1964): "Every employer shall furnish employment which
shall be reasonably safe for the employees therein. They shall furnish and use safety
devices and safeguards .. .and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to
protect the life, health, safety and welfare of such employees."
5. The insurer's position in this respect is similar to that of an executive officer
or supervisory employee of an employer, who may be liable as third-party tortfeasor if
the duty of inspection has been delegated to them and they inspect negligently. See,
e.g., Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958); Hebert v.
Blackenship, 187 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), commented upon in 33 LA. L.
REv. 325 (1973); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973). In Canter the court
reviewed the problem of liability based on malfeasance or misfeasance (doing an act
wrongly) versus liability based on nonfeasance (omitting an act), reiterating that the
omission-commission dichotomy is no longer relevant in determining whether there has
been a breach of duty by the officer. Analogizing this situation to that of the insurer
who negligently inspects, it seems the insurer's liability should not be ruled out by the
mere characterization of its inspection as a failure to act, or nonfeasance.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965): "One who undertakes, gratui-
tously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as
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in which one who undertakes gratuitously to render services to an-
other may be liable to that person who is physically harmed as a
result of the negligent rendering of those services: (1) when his failure
to exercise reasonable care has increased the risk of harm; (2) when
he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by another to the injured
person; or (3) when the harm is suffered because the injured person
or the other has relied upon the gratuitous undertaking. Basically the
undertaking, in this case a safety inspection, must have worsened the
condition of the worker, either by creating the safety hazard or by
causing him or his employer to rely on the adequacy of the inspection,
lulling them into a false sense of security that safe conditions did in
fact prevail. Applying these criteria to the instant case, it is difficult
to find an increase in the physical harm to plaintiff or reliance by
either the plaintiff or his employer on the inspection to their detri-
ment. Nowhere is it demonstrated that the inspection was performed
for the benefit of the employer or the employee; it could well have
been an undertaking merely for the purpose of determining the extent
of the risk involved and for reevaluating the feasibility of maintaining
the insurance contract.7 Nor is it shown that the employee was even
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk
of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance on the other or the third
person upon the undertaking." Note that the effect of condition (b), like condition (c),
is essentially a requirement of reliance. This rule has been cited frequently in cases
which hold that the insurer does owe a legal duty to the injured employee. See Evans
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1968); Clark v. Employers Mut. of
Warsaw, 297 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Bartolotta v. U.S., 276 F. Supp. 66 (D.
Conn. 1967); Gerace v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1966); Viducich
v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596 (1963); De Jesus
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Pa. 198, 223 A.2d 849 (1966). Some decisions have not
found reliance to be essential to the insurer's liability. See Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 86, 199 N.E.2d 769, 779 (1964): "We think it clear under the law
that defendant's liability for the negligent performance of its undertaking, as distin-
guished from a failure to perform, is not limited to such persons as might have relied
upon it to act but extends instead to such persons as defendant could reasonably have
foreseen would be endangered as the result of negligent performance." See also Corson
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 210, 265 A.2d 315 (1970); Smith v. American Empl.
Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960).
The Restatement of Torts rule may profitably be compared with Restatement
(Second) of Agency section 354: "An agent who, by promise or otherwise, undertakes
to act for his principal under such circumstances that some action is necessary for the
protection of the person or tangible things of another, is subject to liability to the other
for physical harm to him or his things caused by the reliance of the principal or of the
other upon his undertaking and his subsequent unexercised failure to act, if such
failure creates an unreasonable risk of harm to him and the agent should so realize."
See comments (a) and (b).
7. Evans v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1968); Gerace v. Liberty
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aware that an inspection had been made by the insurer. Finally, the
clear wording of the audit and inspection clause in the insurance
policy precluded any reliance by the employer on the safety inspec-
tions made by the insurer.'
Of course, insurers may clearly expose themselves to liability by
contractually obligating themselves to perform the safety and main-
tenance duties of the employer.!' In the absence of a contract, factual
circumstances indicating that the insurer was inspecting for the bene-
fit of the employee and for the purpose of assuming the employer's
duty might also give rise to liability. This was the situation in two
cases"' in which insurers had carried out extensive, frequent inspec-
tions, had made detailed reports to their insureds making safety rec-
ommendations, and had advertised their safety inspection programs
as part of the insurance benefits. A duty on the part of the insurer
would probably not arise merely because the insurer advertised the
inspections as part of its policy benefits," or because it charged a
percentage of its premiums for inspection and safety engineering for
the insured.' 2 A combination of these factors, however, might induce
actual and justifiable reliance by the employer or the employee re-
sulting in liability.
Madeline Hebert
Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1966). The insurer's position here is similar to
that of the architects in Day v. National U.S. Radiator, 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660
(1961), discussed with approval in the executive officer case of Canter v. Koehring, 283
So. 2d 716, 720 (La. 1973). Liability to the plaintiff (whose decedent was killed when
a defectively installed boiler exploded) was precluded because their inspections of the
work site were not for the purpose of protecting the worker's safety, but for assuring
that the specifications of the contract were being carried out.
8. "The company and any rating authority having jurisdiction by law shall each
be permitted but not obligated to inspect at any reasonable time the workplaces,
operations, machinery and equipment covered by this policy. Neither the right to make
inspections nor the making thereof . . . shall constitute an undertaking on behalf of
or for the benefit of the insured or others, to determine or warrant that such work-
places, operations, machinery or equipment are safe." Kennard v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 277 So. 2d 170, 171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). The use of this type of clause was
foreshadowed in Hill v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 428 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1970):
"If reliance is a prerequisite to liability the insurer may substantially protect itself in
its safety undertakings, and at the same time protect users of the premises who may
be the victims of lack of performance, by making unambiguously clear to the insured,
that it can rely thereon or that it must not rely." See Comment, 3 CUMBERLAND-
SAMFORD L. REV. 118 (1972).
9. Mann v. Highland Ins. Co., 461 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1972); Viducich v. Greater
N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596 (1963).
10. Hill v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1970); Nelson v. Union
Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964).
11. De Jesus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Pa. 198, 223 A.2d 849 (1966).
12. Mann v. Highland Ins. Co., 461 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1972).
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